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Overeducated Achievatrons Unite! 
Joan C. Williams† 
My chief sentiment when I read the pieces submitted for this Collo-
quy was, “Wow, they actually read my book!” We authors pour our souls 
into our texts, send them out into the world, and sometimes feel an unset-
tling silence descend. Let me say at once how grateful I am to Margaret 
Chon for inviting me to Seattle, to Kurt Kruckeberg for his indefatigable 
efforts in soliciting contributions, and to each of the authors for spending 
time reading and responding to my book. Somehow I am certain all had 
other demands on their time. 
Most rewarding was that two of the ten authors—Laura Kessler and 
Lisa Pruitt—self-identified as class migrants and found my description of 
the class culture gap resonant.1 “My experiences with my family reflect a 
near perfect account of the class culture gap described in Williams’s book,” 
notes Laura Kessler. “In sum, I found Williams’s account of the way that 
class is manifested as cultural difference to ring completely true.”2 As 
Lisa Pruitt notes, I attempted to synthesize every major ethnography of 
the white working class in the late twentieth-century United States3—but 
I was also talking about my own life as part of a white working-class 
family for the last thirty-four years. I am glad I got it right. 
And yet Kessler raises a question also raised by Robert Chang, Ri-
chard Delgado, and Jean Stefancic. Here’s how Kessler puts it:  
I cannot help thinking that the most salient characteristics that sepa-
rate me from my manicurist sister are not that she would prefer to 
eat in predictable chain restaurants or that she disapproves of my 
permissive parenting style or that she shops at Walmart and I at 
Costco. Rather, our greatest class differences are found in the fact 
that she earns approximately fifteen percent of my income in a good 
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year, has no pension, has not consistently had access to employer-
subsidized health insurance during her adult life, and has no college 
degree.4 
Does a focus on how class is manifested as cultural difference en-
tail overlooking the structuralist-materialist dimensions of class? 
Not at all: I am a material girl. But here’s the fascinating thing. 
Since 1970, Republicans have adopted policies that have radically in-
creased inequality of incomes and eviscerated the economic stability of 
Americans who are neither rich nor poor with those very Americans’ po-
litical support. Thus my description of how class is expressed as cultural 
difference is designed to answer this question: Why do people like Kess-
ler’s sister so often vote Republican? 
They do, as my book documents extensively. Richard Delgado 
notes, “My suspicion is that the reasons why working-class people have 
not jumped on either Obama’s or Professor Williams’s bandwagon have 
little to do with style points. Rather, working-class people have interests 
that are genuinely adverse to those of upper-class people.”5 True. But the 
Americans whom intellectuals traditionally call “working class”—who 
call themselves “middle class”6—also have economic interests that are 
diametrically opposed to the interests of the business elite. Yet working-
class Americans vote for Republicans, whose economic policies chiefly 
benefit the business elite, again and again. This message comes home to 
me with particular poignancy today: Republicans in the Wisconsin legis-
lature just voted to gut public-sector unions.7 
So the question is why the business elite (Republicans) have been 
able to appeal to working-class voters better than the progressive elite 
(Democrats). The answer I offer is “cultural voting”—that the business 
elite has connected by expressing respect for working-class cultural val-
ues. Given that neither the business elite nor the progressive elite really 
                                                 
 4. Kessler, supra note 1, at 698. 
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deliver for them, many in the working class go with Republicans, who at 
least express respect for their values (whereas Democrats’ social justice 
agenda focuses on poverty, race, and women—not on class privilege). 
This, for me, is an uncomfortable message. I have devoted my life 
to study, and activism, around gender. Equally awkward is the issue of 
race. My focus in Reshaping the Work-Family Debate on the white 
working class stems from Michèle Lamont’s The Dignity of Working 
Men, which details the cultural differences between working-class whites 
and same-class blacks.8 In describing working-class Americans, Lamont 
contrasts the “disciplined self” valued by white Americans with the “car-
ing self” valued by black Americans. The disciplined self values respon-
sibility and perseverance and seeks to preserve a world in moral order. 
White working-class men draw hard boundaries towards the poor, whose 
poverty they attribute to a lack of self-discipline. African-American 
working-class men, in contrast, place greater emphasis on solidarity and 
generosity. Lamont found American working-class blacks were more 
like the French than they were like their white counterparts. African-
American workers, like the French, had a structural view of poverty and 
of class—more of a “there but for the grace of God go I” perspective 
than whites’ assumption that “anyone who works hard can make it.” 
I took Lamont’s analysis at face value, and I have little doubt that it 
is true as far as it goes. Yet while on book tour, I began to see things in a 
different light, given that many of the young people who responded most 
strongly as class migrants were people of color. They recounted the kinds 
of class affronts I picked up from the memoirs of class migrants. But 
mostly they expressed anxiety that their migration into the elite would 
leave them alienated from the values they grew up with and still hold 
dear. Asked a young woman of color at Harvard: “How can class mi-
grants who were born into working-class families, and blessed with cer-
tain opportunities [that give them access to the elite] . . . but still have the 
same [working-class] values . . . ingrained in them, . . . how does this 
affect their ability to move up?”9 I tried to reassure her, but another Afri-
can-American audience member who often works with black profession-
als stated that, in her view, working-class values sometimes do impede 
people of color’s ability to attain professional success. 
These reactions have profound implications: they suggest that if 
Democrats reach out to working-class voters, Democrats stand to connect 
better not only with non-elite whites but also with non-elite people of 
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color. Bridging the class culture gap can help remedy Democrats’ ten-
dency to take African-American and Latino voters for granted. All this 
only goes to prove what Jean Stefancic said so eloquently: “ignoring ra-
cial dynamics diminishes the whole picture.”10 Thanks to her, and to Ri-
chard Delgado and Robert Chang, for helping me think this through. 
Chang, Delgado, and Stefancic also express the view that any coali-
tions with white workers are likely to be “shaky and temporary”11 be-
cause the interests involved are genuinely adverse,12 and because white 
men invest too much in their privileged racial and gender identities.13 But 
remember: Republicans have managed to construct and sustain a long-
term coalition that has transformed American politics with white workers 
whose economic interests they do not share. 
All this is to say that, although I am a material girl, I recognize that 
we do not live by bread alone. Dignity and meaning-creation are equally 
important. So it is possible to connect with people whose economic in-
terests do not sync with yours if you connect with the symbols and the 
values that give dignity and meaning to their lives. That’s what the Re-
publicans have done, and I propose that Democrats follow the same path. 
But it won’t be easy, as illustrated by the following story: 
The first time I gave a talk on this book, in San Francisco, I met a 
thoughtful and progressive colleague as we were going out the door and 
asked her what she thought. “It’s hard,” she said, “to think of myself as 
part of an elite.” 
Hard, but necessary. She is a successful lawyer. My book aims not 
only to describe working-class culture, but also to defamiliarize our own 
cultural givens, and those of the “upper-middle class” among whom I 
have lived my entire life. “Williams does not assume that the upper-
middle class are ‘class-less’ or that theirs is the default culture,” notes 
Lisa Pruitt.14 “She thus does with regard to class one of the things critical 
race and feminist scholars have done for race and gender respectively: 
challenge the notion that whites don’t have race and that men don’t have 
gender.”15 My goal is not only to show that we professional-managerial 
progressives have our own folkways, but also that our folkways can be 
pretty odd, and sometimes downright unhealthy. I propose that we learn 
from the working class how not to mistake our jobs for a life, and how 
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ing the Work-Family Debate, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 815, 823 (2011). 
 11. Id. at 822. 
 12. Delgado, supra note 5, at 841. 
 13. Robert S. Chang, Joan Williams, Coalitions, and Getting Beyond the Wages of Whiteness 
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not to place our children under hydraulic performance pressure in the 
name of “making sure they live up to their potential.” 
This leads me to a further discussion of Pruitt’s pathbreaking work 
on class dynamics in the United States.16 Her leadership in this arena 
makes me particularly grateful for the close attention she has paid to my 
book. In a challenging essay, Pruitt argues that “the culture wars are now 
largely being fought—at least rhetorically—across the rural–urban di-
vide.”17 
No doubt she is on to something. Pruitt provides ample evidence 
that Sarah Palin and others have begun to talk about the class culture gap 
as a clash between urban and rural. We “coastal elites” talk of “flyover 
states”—just the kind of cultural insult I uncovered in the memoirs of 
class migrants with respect to the white working class. 
Yet I resist redefining class conflict in the United States completely 
as an urban-versus-rural issue for several reasons. First, some rural plac-
es are bright blue: my family is from Vermont, which is as blue as a sun-
ny sky and as rural as they come. Second, the coasts do have a lot of 
“overeducated Achievatrons” (to quote David Brooks’s term for the Ivy-
encrusted glamoratti surrounding the Obamas).18 But the coasts also are 
home to a lot of truck drivers, manicurists, bank tellers, and government 
clerks—solid folk who are neither rich nor poor. The association of the 
coasts with metrosexual Achievatrons is strong but, ultimately, meta-
phorical. After all, San Diego, a coastal city, is staunchly conservative, 
and Oberlin and Santa Cruz are rural but bright blue. 
At a deeper level, I resist conflating class with geography because 
this is one way Americans have evaded facing social hierarchy head on. I 
say this as a former city planner, who was interested in “urban issues” in 
the 1970s and 1980s, until I came to the conclusion that talking about 
“urban” problems simply served to distract attention from the key issues 
affecting cities, which were racial hierarchy and racial disadvantage. We 
need to talk about problems of class as problems of social hierarchy, not 
problems of geography. Perhaps it is not so much that working-class 
people are rural, but that professional-managerial progressives tend to be 
                                                 
 16. See, e.g., Lisa R. Pruitt, Missing the Mark: Welfare Reform and Rural Poverty, 10 J. 
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 439 (2007); Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. REV. 159 (2006); 
Lisa R. Pruitt, Spatial Inequality as Constitutional Infirmity: Equal Protection, Child Poverty and 
Place, 71 MONT. L. REV. 1 (2010); Lisa R. Pruitt, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Rural, 2007 
UTAH L. REV. 421. 
 17. Pruitt, supra note 1, at 772. 
 18. See David Brooks, The Insider’s Crusade, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.ny 
times.com/2008/11/21/opinion/21brooks.html; see also Pruitt, supra note 1, at 781 (also quoting this 
phrase). 
850 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:845 
either coastal or in college towns. This intuition might be worth checking 
out.  
Beyond this, Pruitt makes several other important points that com-
plicate my class categories. She points out that the tension between 
“hard-living” and “settled-living” families is a tension within the work-
ing class.19 She also points out that professional-managerial folks who 
live in rural areas tend not to be progressives; they tend to be small-town 
Rotary Club types who vote Republican with the rest of the business 
elite.20 
I also am intrigued by, but have some reservations about, Pruitt’s 
suggestion that work might serve as a common ground around which the 
white working class and professional-managerial progressives could ral-
ly.21 An interesting idea. Yet white workers are insistent that work obses-
sion among the elite is unbalanced—they see it as part and parcel of the 
elite’s willingness to sacrifice the good of the family in the name of per-
sonal ambition. Lamont found that white workers, while definitely proud 
of their hard work, tend to value that work as a way to draw boundaries 
against slackers—hard-living whites and blacks (for whom they make an 
unjustly global association with hard living). In contrast, working-class 
whites distinguish between their hard work and that of professionals. 
Thus a pipe fitter criticized “shirt and tie types”: “They are jockeying for 
jobs and worrying about whether they are making the right moves and 
stuff. I feel I don’t have to get involved in that stuff.”22 An electronics 
technician criticized overly ambitious people, “so self-assured, so self-
intense that they really don’t care about anyone else. . . . It’s me, me, me, 
me, me.”23 The “selfishness of the overly ambitious” he finds shocking—
a viewpoint worth taking seriously.24 One of the class migrants quoted 
above noted that people of color told her: 
I am not these people and these are not my values. . . . These people 
are saying “work comes first” is the most important thing. They’re 
looking at you seriously and you’re saying, “You have got to be 
kidding.” I mean, do you truly believe work is the most important 
thing? . . . I will never buy that because, in my cultural upbringing, 
my obligations are so extensive towards my family, and that family 
is so extensive. . . . I’m not an individualist, so I won’t ultimately 
                                                 
 19. Pruitt, supra note 1, at 794–95. 
 20. Id. at 803–04. 
 21. Id. at 812. 
 22. LAMONT, supra note 8, at 108. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 110. 
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be able to make the sacrifices you need me to make in order to be a 
good “team player.” 25 
Moving from class themes to gender, I wanted first to respond to 
Gowri Ramachandran’s worry that workplace flexibility will serve to 
transfer wealth from social nonconformists (without children) to social-
conformist mommies.26 Sometimes things work out that way in some 
workplaces, but when they do, it is because of bad management. I would 
never argue that parents should be allowed to leave work to take Billy to 
ballet, or to coach Suzy’s soccer team, dumping their work responsibili-
ties onto another, already overburdened, employee. This ends up happen-
ing when employers leave in place their model of the ever-available 
worker, making ad hoc “accommodations” when workers—surprise!—
have children. The more rational and efficient way to design jobs is 
around the not-so-heroic assumption that most people have children—
and that virtually everyone has a web of intimate relationships or sources 
of meaning in their lives outside work. If employers follow this logic, 
they will shift away from the old-fashioned ideal worker (framed in the 
era of breadwinners married to homemakers) towards the model of a ba-
lanced worker who needs to balance a serious career commitment with 
other goals, responsibilities, and dreams. 
This shift should not have to be “too expensive,” another Rama-
chandran worry.27 In fact, a quarter-century-old literature has shown, 
again and again and again,28 that employers save money when they 
match today’s workplace to today’s workforce, rather than insisting on 
preserving the work structures of 1960 in an era when nearly one third of 
hourly workers have elder-care responsibilities,29 and 70% of families 
with children have all adults in the labor force.30 
                                                 
 25. Williams, supra note 9 (audience comments). 
 26. Gowri Ramachandran, Confronting Difference and Finding Common Ground, 34 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 725, 730–31 (2011). 
 27. Id. at 731. 
 28. See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILIES AND WORK 
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000); CORPORATE VOICES FOR WORKING FAMILIES & 
WFD CONSULTING, BUSINESS IMPACTS OF FLEXIBILITY: AN IMPERATIVE FOR EXPANSION (2005), 
available at http://www.cvworkingfamilies.org/system/files/Business%20Impacts%20of%20Flexi 
bility.pdf. 
 29. PETER BERG & ELLEN ERNST KOSSEK, MICH. ST. UNIV. SCH. OF HUMAN RES. & LABOR 
RELATIONS, THE USE OF WORK-LIFE FLEXIBILITY POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MIDDLE-CLASS, 
UNIONIZED WORKERS, SUSTAINABLE WORKFORCE, available at http://www.thesustainable 
workforce.org/images/stories/briefs/issue%20brief%204%20newrevised.pdf. 
 30. Karen Kornbluh, The Parent Trap, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 111. 
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Proceeding on to other gender themes, Ann McGinley and Katha-
rine Silbaugh both focus on masculinity.31 I read Ann McGinley’s piece 
with the same excitement and embarrassment with which I read Lisa 
Pruitt’s—excitement because they had found relevant studies I never 
found, and embarrassment for precisely the same reason. McGinley’s 
insights into why men so often see themselves as powerless are chilling. 
Manhood, unlike womanhood, is a precarious state that has to be earned 
over and over, resulting in constant status negotiations among men.32 
Consequently, men often find themselves caught in “mine’s bigger than 
yours” dynamics that leave them feeling anxious and vulnerable. The 
conventional antidote is gender-bonding among men, often by harassing 
women or mistreating gender-nonconforming men, as McGinley points 
out.33 I am grateful and relieved to have feminist colleagues whose work 
is “an exception to feminist work that sees men as unidimensional,”34 not 
only because the us-versus-them approach strikes me as leading to 
flawed strategies for social change, but also because that strategy is 
shaped by an inaccurate model of the way social privilege operates. So-
cial privilege does not create absolute power. It’s more like a force field 
that gives privileged people a steady assist—so long as they fulfill their 
assigned role. But, as those in queer studies have so eloquently pointed 
out, men who do not fulfill their assigned role may well be at literal risk 
of their lives. This is what privilege looks like—which does not mean it 
is not privilege—but that privilege comes packaged with a straightjack-
et.35 
McGinley’s most astute insight is that: 
Ironically, it is a performance of masculinity for a working class 
man to refuse to discuss his child care responsibilities with his male 
coworkers. The injuries caused by an admission that a man has fam-
ily care responsibilities may be invisible, but such an admission 
would undermine his masculinity in his own eyes and in the eyes of 
his fellow workers.36  
This highlights, as Robert Chang reminds us,37 that men’s investments in 
gender privilege make change difficult. 
                                                 
 31. Ann C. McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 703 
(2011); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Deliverable Male, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 733 (2011). 
 32. Joseph A. Vandello et al., Precarious Manhood, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1325 (2008). 
 33. McGinley, supra note 31, at 708. 
 34. Id. at 709. 
 35. Another important contribution of McGinley is her formulation of questions social scien-
tists could usefully study; I will pass these along posthaste! See id. at 716–18. 
 36. Id. at 716. 
 37. See Chang, supra note 13. 
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For precisely this reason, while Katharine Silbaugh is right that 
men should be willing and able to embrace values, jobs, and styles that 
are coded feminine,38 I don’t think the best way to persuade them to do 
so is to tell them to man up and get femmy. I keep remembering the stay-
at-home dad I quoted in Unbending Gender: 
A day of cooking, cleaning, child care and household management 
is not unlike climbing a mountain. Some of it is sweaty, grueling 
work, but the pleasures, such as sunlight through the mist on Mount 
Washington, or seeing a toddler learn a new game, are constant 
enough to make it worth it.39 
My reaction: a guy’s gotta do what a guy’s gotta do. I feel the same 
way when young women lawyers flock to high heels. If that’s what it 
takes for them to be hard-driving professionals, who am I to judge? They 
may well need a foot operation by the time they are my age,40 but my 
solutions were hardly perfect either. Each of us must do what we must to 
make ourselves feel safe and whole. I sometimes wish that didn’t mean 
that most men have to describe counter-gender activity in hypermascu-
line terms—but, well, we didn’t make the world. We’re all just trying to 
get by in it. And if that’s what it takes for people to embrace counter-
gender behavior, so be it. I would rather men feel safe enough to take 
femmy jobs, do child care, and develop people skills, even if the only 
way they can bring themselves to do so is to convince themselves that 
doing those things makes them ever-so-manly. And, besides, did you 
ever think of child care as a hard, sweaty, dirty job? Even false hegemo-
nizing fuels gender flux. 
I also note in passing Silbaugh’s skewering of the rationale for sin-
gle-sex education.41 I knew nothing about the change to Title IX and am 
as troubled as Silbaugh is by its indefensible embrace of outdated gender 
stereotypes. The insistence that boys who do not conform to the man-
dates of conventional masculinity “should be firmly disciplined, required 
to spend more time with ‘normal males,’ and made to play sports” is 
downright shocking.42 Sounds like federally financed homophobia to me. 
                                                 
 38. Silbaugh, supra note 31, at 748–49. 
 39. WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 194. 
 40. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND 
LAW 4 (“Women account for about 80 percent of all foot surgery, much of it related to high heels.”). 
 41. Silbaugh, supra note 31, at 739–40, 743–46. 
 42. Silbaugh is quoting from an ACLU factsheet; I am assuming that is an accurate representa-
tion of the ideas of Leonard Sax, a physician associated with the brain science single-sex education 
movement. Id. at 745 (quoting AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BOYS’ BRAINS VS. GIRLS’ BRAINS: 
WHAT SEX SEGREGATION TEACHES STUDENTS (2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/womens-
rights/boys-brains-vs-girls-brains-what-sex-segregation-teaches-students-0#5). 
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Beth Burkstrand-Reid and Laura Kessler return me to what Kessler 
correctly identifies as my life’s work: deconstructing domesticity.43 
Burkstrand-Reid insightfully explores how domesticity’s devaluation of 
care work affects stay-at-home fathers as well as mothers.44 Her insight 
that stay-at-home fathers are seen as altruistically sacrificing their ca-
reers, while stay-at-home mothers are seen as sacrificing for their child-
ren’s welfare (while their poor husbands have to support them), shows 
clearly how the ideology of domesticity often serves to veil men’s gender 
privilege.45 Burkstrand-Reid also picks up on how stay-at-home fathers 
(like other men) give rationales for their gender-bending behavior that 
align them with the traditionally masculine: the Fortune article, after 
reassuring us that these men are not “wimps,” assures us that they left 
heftily masculine jobs . . . for the money.46 “Opting out,” for them, is just 
another way of providing for the family? 
Burkstrand-Reid’s important underlying point is that a gender role 
switch, in which a few men “opt out” to allow their wives to perform as 
ever-available ideal workers, is as much a step backwards as forwards. 
On the one hand, this solution does jiggle gender roles by sending the 
message that the parent at home can be either a father or a mother. On 
the other hand, this false gender neutrality often serves as a modern ra-
tionale for continuing to define workplace ideals around men and mascu-
linity, and for continuing to devalue caregiving in ways that make any-
one who is associated with it—man or woman—economically vulnera-
ble.47 
I have long admired Laura Kessler’s scholarship around care 
work,48 and this piece is no exception. Kessler is right to point out that, 
while I have shifted away from classic feminist language and the femin-
ist canon, my goal remains to transform the economy to make the world 
safe for care work and for the men and women who do it. Just today, I 
was talking with someone who has invited me to speak at a conference 
for social workers in the child welfare system. She was urging me to re-
peat my oft-repeated mantra that a society that marginalizes its mothers 
                                                 
 43. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989). 
 44. Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, “Trophy Husbands” & “Opt-Out” Moms, 34 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 663 (2011). 
 45. Id. at 671–72. 
 46. Id. at 672 (citing Betsy Morris, Trophy Husbands, FORTUNE, Oct. 14, 2002). 
 47. Joan C. Williams, Mary Blair-Loy & Jennifer Berdahl, The Flexibility Stigma, J. SOC. 
ISSUES (fortchoming 2012). 
 48. Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47; Laura T. Kessler, 
The Politics of Care, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 169 (2008); Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive 
Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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impoverishes its children. I would not call this Marxism, yet Kessler is 
right that I remain a material girl. 
I also appreciate Kessler’s understanding of the social role I seek to 
play. Seeking to make a concrete change in the world does involve leav-
ing many otherwise troubling assumptions in place, in order to connect 
with people and be persuasive. “[B]y trying to appeal to a broad au-
dience, Williams leaves in place some key building blocks of domesticity 
that many Americans may not be willing to abandon.”49 I have tried to 
forge a new model of what it means to be a law professor committed to 
social change. In place of the existing model of someone who makes 
grand pronouncements about the way the world should be, or how judges 
should decide, my focus has been on how to orchestrate different sets of 
social actors to move us from point A to point B. 
This new image of the law professor brings me to Nancy Levit’s 
point about narrative.50 Law professors interested in social change, in my 
view, could contribute a lot by entering the public sphere to change so-
cial narratives. I have tried to do this several times, with some success. 
Levit discusses my effort to convince the media to acknowledge that 
women often don’t opt out; they are pushed out by workplace inflexibili-
ty and gender bias against mothers.51 A related effort has been to con-
vince reporters to write stories about maternal-wall bias against mothers. 
I was pleased when a male reporter on the business page of the New York 
Times, writing an article pointing out that all three of the women recently 
nominated to the Supreme Court have no children, interpreted this not as 
evidence that mommies opt off the fast track but that the labor market is 
hostile to mothers.52 
After publishing a WorkLife Law study using union arbitrations 
that documented how many working-class families are one sick child 
away from being fired,53 I received a call from a Bush Administration 
Undersecretary of Labor who thanked me for the report. The Undersecre-
tary said that when economists argued for the eliminations of that inter-
mittent family and medical leave because workers were just using the 
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leave to game the system, people within the Department of Labor used 
the report’s vivid stories to say, “No, look, people claim intermittent 
FMLA leave because they really need time off.” Levit’s point about the 
social power of narrative is very well taken. 
In conclusion, a plea: We need to open up a conversation about new 
roles for law professors as social persuaders. The old model of the law 
professor pronouncing “The Way Things Should Be” from on high made 
sense in times gone by, when a liberal professoriate was speaking to lib-
eral courts and legislatures. We’re in a very different situation today. The 
vision remains vitally important: you’ve got to have a dream; if you 
don’t have a dream, how’re you gonna have a dream come true? That 
said, we also need alternatives. We need to carve out a role for law pro-
fessors committed to creating concrete cultural, legal, and organizational 
change within a two-to-five-year time frame. What we need is a new, 
pragmatic model for those whose goal is to work on a shorter time frame, 
to nudge the limits of the possible. 
